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The consequences of foreign direct investment (FDI) for human rights protection are poorly 
understood. We propose that the impact of FDI varies across industries. In particular, extractive 
firms in the oil and mining industries go where the resources are located and are bound to such 
investment, which creates a status quo bias among them when it comes to supporting repressive 
rulers (“location-bound effect”). The same is not true for non-extractive MNCs in manufacturing 
or services, which can, in comparison, exit problematic countries more easily. We also propose 
that strong democratic institutions can alleviate negative impacts of extractive FDI on human 
rights (“democratic safeguard effect”). Using US FDI broken up into extractive and non-
extractive industries in 157 host countries (1999–2015), we find support for these propositions. 
Extractive FDI is associated with more human rights abuse, but non-extractive FDI is associated 
with less abuse, after controlling for other factors, including concerns about endogeneity. We 
find also that the negative human rights impact of extractive FDI vanishes in countries where 
democratic institutions are stronger. Our results are robust to a range of alternative estimation 
techniques. 
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The literature on multinational corporations (MNCs) and their human rights impact has 
developed in different fields, most prominently in international law (Muchlinski, 2001; Ratner, 
2001), but also in business ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives (Wettstein, 
2009), development studies (Moran, 2006), political science (Kobrin, 2009; Hertel, 2019), and 
more recently, in international business (Wettstein et al., 2019). There is increasing agreement in 
the international community and across academic disciplines that firms bear certain human rights 
responsibilities, which has led to the adoption of the United Nations Global Principles for 
Business and Human Rights (Ruggie, 2011), the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(OECD, 2011), and the creation of the United Nations Global Compact, to which stakeholders, 
including firms, subscribe for demonstrating commitment towards respecting human rights and 
higher social standards (see Rasche, Waddock & McIntosh, 2013). Some see this as a positive 
development, where firms pay more attention to their societal impact (Vogel, 2005, 2010). 
Others bemoan the lack of initiatives in soft and hard law, especially in the extractive sectors, 
and argue that governments with control over natural resources and their MNC allies face little in 
the way of legal constraints (Schrempf-Stirling & Wettstein, 2017). As Leif Wenar (2016) 
argues, the law that still applies in the global extractive industry, particularly regarding oil, is that 
“might makes right”, or those that forcibly occupying natural resources become acceptable legal 
owners of them. 
Alongside normative and legalistic discussions around the responsibilities of firms, and 
how these responsibilities might translate into policy, a range of studies has attempted to assess 
the effects of multinational corporations on human rights empirically, using either cross-country 
statistical analyses at the macro level, or single case studies on the micro level. There is, 
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unfortunately, little interaction between empirical studies on the macro and micro level across 
disciplines, and existing evidence is highly mixed (Fontanier & Kolk, 2007; Giuliani & Macchi, 
2014; Meyer, 2004). Importantly, studies have assessed the effects of all types of firms rather 
than examine more carefully the heterogeneity of reasons for why a firm might be complicit in 
human rights violations. 
Most case studies, especially those examining controversial industries, or MNCs in areas 
of weak governance, find that human rights are not respected by firms (e.g., Eweje, 2005; 
Idemudia, 2009; Yu, 2008; Turcotte et al., 2007). On the other side of the spectrum, striving for 
generalization, the quantitative literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) has investigated 
cross-country patterns, and most of the statistical studies support the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
(Williamson, 1990, 2000), or liberal view, which is that MNCs have positive effects on 
government respect for human rights, with some confusion as to the direction of causality 
(Meyer, 1996; Cingranelli & Richards, 1999; Apodaca, 2001; Apodaca, 2002; Hafner-Burton, 
2005).1  
The recent business literature has criticised quantitative studies for lumping all forms of 
FDI together and for ignoring the fact that industry-level characteristics are likely to influence 
firms’ human rights impact (Fortanier & Kolk, 2007; Giuliani & Macchi, 2014). Industries differ 
along economic and social dimensions, such as production inputs and outputs, technologies, 
choice of location, and the “footlooseness” of firms (Godfrey, Hatch & Hansen, 2010). Since 
FDI has become increasingly diverse over the last decades, its global impact may not be easily 
determined by using aggregate FDI data. Moreover, it is not clear at all how and in what ways 
 
1 Hardly any statistical studies find negative effects of FDI on rights (Clark & Kwon, 2018; Smith, Bolyard & 
Ippolito, 1999). Many quantitative studies find that there is no significant link, possibly because positive and 
negative effects from different industry sectors cancel each other out when aggregate FDI is used (e.g. Sorens & 
Ruger, 2012; Cao, Greenhill & Prakash, 2012). 
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firms might be directly responsible for violating the rights of people, and what portion of the 
blame might be assigned to the economic motives of companies relative to the political motives 
of host governments.  
We revisit the question of FDI’s impact on human rights by integrating insights from 
qualitative work, namely that industry sectors and host country context matter. We build on two 
quantitative pioneering studies that are more refined than previous work. Janz (2018) finds that 
the presence of multinational corporations in developing countries is positively connected to 
rights outcomes, but only when FDI is invested in industries with medium or high skills and 
technology levels, such as services. Blanton and Blanton (2009) show that the ability of countries 
to attract FDI via lax regulation, or suppressed labour standards, only works for some industry 
sectors and not for all types of FDI. These studies provide preliminary evidence that effects from 
FDI might vary across industries, but we do not yet know the specific reasons why some FDI has 
negative impacts, or how host-country conditions influence the locational environments that 
firms choose. Given the risks attached to political instability, and the general aversion of 
companies to violence-based risks, why firms would decide to locate in high risk environments 
must lie in locational advantages.  
We ask, therefore, what is the impact of FDI on human rights across different industry 
sectors, and what differences exist if any between extractive (oil, mining) vs. non-extractive 
industries (manufacturing, services)? We focus on this distinction because among qualitative 
case studies, there is a great deal of attention paid to the negative impacts in extractive sectors, 
which has amounted to the theory of the so called “resource curse” that drives autocratic and 
corrupt politics in resource-wealthy states (e.g. Eweje, 2006a, 2006b, 2009; Idemudia, 2009; 
MacDonald & McLaughlin, 2003; Ross, 2012). Many local communities and social activists are 
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willing to give up on potential economic benefits from FDI and oppose new extractive 
investment, because they fear that extraction leads to human rights abuses in local communities, 
where foreign companies run rough shod over the interests and demands of people (Dashwood, 
2014; Mutti, Yakovleva, Vazquez-Brust, & Di Marco, 2012).  
Our argument is twofold: First, extractive FDI is location-bound, so that firms have little 
incentive to punish repressive host countries given that they are the “legal” owners of these 
assets. Even if there are external incentives for firms to divest from repressive regimes due to 
voluntary industry standards and pressure from NGOs and the media, extractive firms are 
unlikely to lobby host country governments for better human rights conditions or threaten with 
withdrawal because they can be easily replaced. Indeed, extractive MNCs are bound by the low-
mobility features of their sector, and threats to leave would simply not be credible (“location-
bound effect”). Moreover, when a company is specialized in extraction, recovering losses from 
the sunk costs will depend heavily on retaining access to the natural resources. 
Second, we argue that foreign investors operate not only within industries, but they are 
also subject to domestic country context. If firms decide to invest in – or remain in - repressive 
host countries, they may become complicit in wrongdoings since they provide revenue to such 
governments (Clapham, 2006; Wettstein, 2010). This negative view is particularly relevant for 
institutionally weak countries. In other words, host country potential for handling dissent 
generated by an FDI project is dependent on strong institutional quality.2 Even though the 
challenge of domestic governance gaps and institutional voids is a core concern in the Business 
and Human Rights field (Wettstein et al., 2019), there are hardly any quantitative studies on FDI 
and human rights that test for such conditional effects, with rare exceptions (Wang, 2017; Clark 
and Kwon, 2018). The studies that do exist do not distinguish between different industries. We 
 
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us in this direction. 
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propose that democratic institutions provide safeguards for human rights protection by keeping 
leaders (and MNCs) in check (“democratic safeguard effect”). The effectiveness of global 
voluntary codes of conduct, such as the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (Ruggie, 2011), or the updated OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations (OECD, 
2011), are likely to be influenced by the interplay between industry sector characteristics and 
host country institutions. We shed more light on this by examining this issue empirically.  
We examine US FDI located within 157 host countries (1999-2015), for which 
disaggregated data are available. We find that extractive FDI is associated with negative effects 
on human rights, but non-extractive FDI shows positive effects, after controlling for a range of 
relevant factors, including the possibility of endogeneity. We further examine the conditioning 
effect of host country institutions, finding that the negative effect of extractive FDI on human 
rights becomes insignificant in countries where institutions are stronger. The results are robust to 
sample size, estimation technique, and alternative specifications. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows: In the next section, we discuss the features of different types of FDI, in 
particular, extractive investment, and how they are linked to human rights within the wider 
country context. We then test the proposed links empirically in a cross-country time-series 
analysis. The conclusion outlines the implications of our findings for future research.  
 
2. Extractive FDI, human rights, and democratic safeguards   
Our overall argument rests on the assumption that firms which operate in the same sector will 
adjust their behaviour in a similar way, which leads to institutional isomorphism and 
homogenisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Chand & Fraser, 2006; Griffin and Mahon, 1997). 
Each industry, such as natural resource extraction, manufacturing, or services, has a normative, 
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regulative and economic structure to which MNCs adapt their behaviour (March & Olsen, 2006; 
Scott, 1995). For example, industries differ in their use of skill levels, location decisions, the 
competitive behavior among firms, or role of branding, and CSR efforts (Beschorner & Hajduk, 
2017; Giuliani & Macchi, 2014; Godfrey et al., 2010; Meyer, 2004). While there is also within-
industry variation of companies’ individual behavior, we propose that it is the unique features of 
industry sectors that shape overall patterns of human rights impact on host countries because 
most firms, by and large, face the same incentives shaping their behavior. 
The focus of our theory lies in distinguishing between extractive versus non-extractive 
FDI, because extractive sectors, such as oil or mining, have two distinct industry-related features 
that are different from other sectors. First, under the ‘natural resource-seeking motive’, foreign 
investment in extractive sectors requires developing and controlling the sources of supply of raw 
materials, which are the primary commodities required for production. Second, extractive FDI 
involves huge capital investments. Therefore, investment of extractive FDI may not be able or 
willing to avoid investing in repressive regimes where resources are located; and divestment 
from host countries during times of political instability and repression is almost impossible 
because of high sunk costs and the location-bound nature of this type of FDI (Vernon, 1971). 
Moreover, global law recognizes even highly repressive regimes in control of natural resources 
as the legal owners of these assets according to the principle of “might makes right” (Wenar, 
2016). Investments in extractive sectors are also more vulnerable to issues of domestic security, 
because a change in the status quo might mean replacement of leaders, negotiating a new deal, 
and perhaps complete or partial loss of monopoly rents. A similar logic has been used to explain 
why ruling elites in resource wealthy countries avoid reforms—the fear of replacement and the 
loss of future monopoly rents (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). Extractive investments may, in 
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other words, have a status quo bias because of insecurity of rights obtained for extracting natural 
resources. High sunk costs, thus, reduce the incentives of extractive FDI to sanction ruling elites 
who promise stability by using repression to weaken opposition movements or local unrest. 
Simultaneously, governments facing dissent know these constraints, and can safely ignore 
extractive MNC preferences of not wanting to be associated with repression. Crucially, due to 
high sunk costs and the location-bound nature of extractive FDI, threats of withdrawal will not 
be credible, so that MNCs in the extractive sector have little leverage over repressive host 
countries.  
This location-bound, high-sunk cost nature of extractive industries perpetuates well-
known issues including human rights challenges. For example, the location of resources often 
involves forced displacement and a loss of livelihood for local communities, exploitation of low-
skilled workers, and environmental pollution (Eweje, 2006a, 2006b). These issues have led to 
protests, sabotage and subsequent security challenges across extractive sectors in the past 
(Dashwood, 2014; Mutti et al., 2012). A prominent example is the Niger Delta, where 
government security forces used violence against activists and local protesters (Frynas, 1998; 
Idemudia, 2009; MacDonald & McLaughlin, 2003). Indeed, a detailed list of cases on human 
rights violations registered under The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) of 1789 of the US 
government against US firms operating in various developing countries reports that the majority 
of the cases are associated with extractive investments (see our summary in the appendix).  
Our argument does not claim that there is no within-industry variation in the extractive 
sector, or that all extractive firms are bound to actively violate human rights. Firms do have 
agency in how they behave towards their employees, local communities, and the environment, 
and they are increasingly being held accountable via industry-level standards, multilateral 
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treaties, and international law. For example, the 2013 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for 
Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (OECD, 
2013), and the 2017 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement in 
the Extractive Sector (OECD, 2017), aim to support firms in reducing their negative impacts. 
The 2010 Conflict Minerals provision of the Dodd-Frank Act for US companies, which now 
have to disclose the use of conflict minerals in their supply chains, has similar goals. Similarly, a 
crucial finding from the ‘naming and shaming’ literature is that recent developments to hold 
firms accountable have created pressure on foreign investors to divest from repressive regimes to 
avoid reputational damage (Barry, Clay, & Finn, 2013; Vadlamannati, Janz, & Berentsen, 2018). 
This issue is also discussed within the business literature, where firms might be seen as political 
and powerful actors that can step in when states are unable to provide public goods to their 
citizens, lobby governments for improvements, and drive a “race to the top” (Matten & Crane, 
2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Westermann-Behaylo, Rehbein, & Fort, 2015). 
However, there are features of the extractive industry that are unique among other FDI – 
high sunk cost and location-bound raw materials – which are likely to strongly influence the 
behavior of firms in problematic host environments. Even if some ‘good’ extractive firms wanted 
to pressure repressive regimes to improve the rule of law and human rights protection, any exit 
threat in the extractive industry is not likely to be credible, as host governments are also aware of 
the low mobility of such investment. In sum, a combination of ‘bad behavior’ of some – but 
surely not all – extractive MNCs, together with low mobility of such FDI and low credible exit 
threats, we expect this kind of FDI to have negative impacts on human rights protection. The 
examination of this argument is crucial because most recent developments in hard and mostly 
soft law to improve MNCs’ behavior, as well as pressure from NGOs and the media, may only 
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be effective to some extent – they may not change the industry’s effect as a whole due to the 
nature of how raw material extraction works. 
In comparison, non-extractive FDI, for example, service sectors or manufacturing, is 
more footloose relative to extractive FDI, and has fewer barriers against its choice of location 
(Kobrin, 2009). MNCs can divide up their activities in many locations and use outsourcing from 
multiple plants in their overall risk-reducing strategies (Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, & Naughton, 
2007) to hedge against risk emanating from one specific location. The sunk cost involved in non-
extractive sectors can, at times, also be high; but non-extractive sectors are not generally bound 
to particular raw material locations, where the real value is in the ground. Non-extractive 
industries which have heavily invested in a host country may not have any interest to leave 
repressive regimes, but if they wanted to, they could. Any exit threat would be much more 
credible than in the extractive industry. Moreover, manufacturing and service FDI are likely to 
be more important where the ‘resource curse’ effects of high dissent and bad governance are 
generally absent, simply because non-extractive FDI is deterred by political instability and 
corruption, which are often associated with the resource curse (Asiedu, 2006; Globerman and 
Shapiro, 2003). This means that not only is a good environment, such as democracy and good 
governance, attractive to non-extractive FDI, but this FDI is less biased towards the status quo 
and less location-bound, thereby having greater freedom to disassociate from human rights 
violations and threaten exit. This does not mean, however, that other kinds of FDI are absent 
where natural resources exist, but that the policy environments in resource dependent states, 
often characterized by high corruption and predatory regimes, are likely to attract less non-
extractive FDI (Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Wenar, 2016). 
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To sum up, extractive multinationals have to go where the resources are located, which 
creates a status quo bias among them when it comes to supporting repressive rulers. Under these 
conditions, FDI is likely to be far more aligned with state actions despite damage to reputations. 
The same is not true for non-extractive MNCs, which can exit more easily, or threaten credibly 
to do so. Thus, we propose to test the following main hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  
“Location-bound effect”: Ceteris paribus, extractive FDI is connected to worse government 
respect for human rights, in comparison with non-extractive sectors. 
 
We argue further that this relationship can be expected to vary according to host country 
institutions. UN Special Representative for Business and Human Rights (SRSG) John Ruggie 
has stated that the “root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in the 
governance gaps created by globalization - between the scope and impact of economic forces and 
actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequences.” (Ruggie, 2008: 189). 
Not all countries that receive extractive FDI are repressive regimes (e.g. Canada, Norway, 
Australia), and their positive human rights record indicates that democratic institutions can 
significantly mitigate negative impacts. One of the most accepted theories in comparative human 
rights research is that democratic institutions increase the costs of using repressive behavior for 
leaders, because they can be voted out of office. They also provide alternative mechanisms of 
control for citizens via participation, so that grievances are expressed at the ballot rather than in 
violent protests (Davenport, 2007). Domestic institutions of host countries that reduce instability 
can benefit from FDI. Democratic institutions can also mitigate the negative effects from FDI 
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once it is present, keeping leaders’ repressive tendencies in check, and shaping adequate policy 
responses that steer away from repressive action e.g. during security crises around extraction 
sites (Wang, 2017). In fact, protests and instability may not even occur in the first place, because 
democratic institutions provide for other ways for citizens to voice disagreement with MNC’s, 
including the resort to legal action (Schrempf-Stirling & Wettstein, 2017). Clark and Kwon 
(2018) examine if the effect of FDI stock varies by regime type, showing that the harmful impact 
of foreign capital on human rights might be significantly weaker in democratic states. We extend 
this argument to extractive industries and propose that democratic institutions condition the 
effects of extractive FDI in a way that reduce human rights repression. 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
“Democratic safeguard effect”: The effect of extractive FDI on human rights is conditional on 
democratic institutions, which reduce negative impacts from FDI. 
 
3. Data & Methods 
3.1 Model Specifications 
To examine our theoretical propositions, we apply panel data covering 157 countries (see 
Appendix 2 for list of countries) over the 1999–2015 (17 years) period for which we have US 
FDI data. Since some of the data are not available for all countries for all years, our dataset is 





Wherein, itPTS is our outcome variable, which measures the degree to which a government 
practices the violations of physical integrity rights of citizens measured by the Political Terror 
Scale (PTS) index,  is the intercept, Hit-1 is our main variables of interest,  Zit-1 are control 
variables, and i is country dummies,  is year-specific dummies, and ωit is the error term.  
The PTS index measures the amount violations of personal integrity rights, such as 
politically motivated execution, torture, forced disappearance, unlawful imprisonment and 
discrimination based on political and religious beliefs (Gibney & Dalton, 1996). The PTS data 
are generated from two sources of information—namely, from Amnesty International country 
reports and annual country reports supplied by the United States State Department. The PTS 
scale is widely used and shows high correspondence with other measures of state repression. The 
PTS is defined as follows. 
 
1 if countries are under secure rule of law, political imprisonment and torture are 
rare, and the political murders are extremely rare;  
 
2 if imprisonment for non-violent political activities is limited, torture and beating 
are exceptional, and political murder rare;  
 
3 if political imprisonment is extensive, execution and political murder may be 
common, and detention for political views are acceptable;  
  
4 if the practices of level 3 are expanded to a larger segment of population, murders 
and disappearances are common, but terror affects primarily those who interest 
themselves in political practices and ideas 
 
5 if level of terror are population wide, and decision makers do not limit themselves 
by which they pursue private and ideological goals 
 
Therefore, a higher value denotes more violations of human rights. We take the average of 
the two measures from the Amnesty International and the US State Department to avoid any 
subjective biases, especially in the data from the State Department as suggested by Qian and 
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Yanagizawa (2009) and Poe et al. (2001).3 This index is a commonly accepted measure for 
human rights protection and has been used widely in the literature (Vadlamannati et al., 2018; 
Davenport & Nordas, 2013; Davenport & Armstrong, 2004; Walker & Poe, 2002). The mean of 
the PTS index during 1999-2015 is 2.68 with a standard deviation of 1.09.  
Hit-1 captures our main variables of interest, which are lagged by one year to reduce bias 
from simultaneity. These include (i) total US FDI stock per capita (log), and (ii) disaggregated 
US FDI per capita (log) provided by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) database on 
Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position.4 The BEA defines US direct investment 
abroad as either ownership or control of 10 percent or more of a foreign business enterprise, 
voting securities or the equivalent.5 The data is recorded in historical cost basis and hence cannot 
be identifiable in constant nor current prices (Blanton & Blanton, 2009). The BEA data captures 
the US FDI position abroad disaggregated by industry sector from 1989 onwards. It should be 
noted that the industry classification of US FDI by the BEA was converted from Industrial 
Classification (SIC) to North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) in 1998. 
Therefore, we use the data from 1999 onwards for consistency. As mentioned above, we use FDI 
per capita and log the data to address the problem of skewness. We collect the data on extractive 
(oil, petroleum, mining and minerals) and non-extractive (manufacturing and services) US FDI 
for 157 developing countries based on the availability of data at the BEA. We expect that it is 
mainly the penetration of extractive investments vis-à-vis non-extractive investments that are 
 
3 PTS Amnesty score + PTS State Department, divided by two. For a detailed description on methodology, see: 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/ (accessed Dec 1, 2017). 
4 Although the industrial classification of US FDI by the BEA in 1998 was converted from Industrial Classification 
(SIC) to North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), this does not greatly affect us as we are more 
interested in FDI in extractive sectors like petroleum, gas and mining combined together relative to other sectors. 
See https://www.bea.gov (retrieved October 25, 2019). 
5 Direct investment abroad is defined by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) as “ownership or control, 
directly or indirectly, by one U.S. person, or entity, of 10 percent or more of the voting securities of an incorporated 
foreign business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign business enterprise.” (see  
https://www.bea.gov/help/glossary (retrieved October 25, 2019). 
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associated with more human rights violations in host countries. Since most countries have some 
of both types of investments, we estimate their independent effects on human rights. 
The vector of control variables (Zit) includes other potential determinants of human rights 
which we obtain from the extant literature on the subject. We follow the pioneer studies of Poe 
and Tate (1994) and Poe et al. (1999) and other comprehensive evaluations on determinants of 
repression (Carey & Poe, 2004; Landman, 2006). We avoid the trap of “garbage-can models” or 
“overfitting” by keeping our models simple (Achen, 2005; Schrodt, 2014). We adopt the 
conservative strategy of accounting only for key factors that may directly associate with our 
main independent variables, exploring several other variables in robustness checks. Accordingly, 
we control for economic development by including per capita income (log) in US$ constant 
prices taken from the World Development Indicators 2018 (WDI). Country size (population, log) 
is an important control because governance and rights protection is more challenging in larger 
countries, which may also attract higher values of FDI due to market size. Next, we include a 
measure of regime type based on the Polity IV data (Gurr & Jaggers, 1995). We create a set of 
dummies for democracy and autocracy using the Polity IV index above +6 representing full 
democracy, which takes the value 1, and 0 otherwise.6 Likewise, we include an autocracy 
dummy, which takes the value 1 if the Polity IV index is below -6, and 0 if not. The reference 
category is made up of imperfectly-institutionalized regimes, referred to as anocracies (Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003). Additionally, we include a variable measuring civil war that takes the value 1 if 
there is armed conflict between an organized rebel group and a state where at least 25 deaths 
have occurred in a single year, and 0 otherwise (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Naturally, an ongoing 
civil war is likely to affect the degree of state repression. We also include a count of the number 
of years of civil peace to distinguish between immediate post-war situations and the history of 
 
6 Note that estimating the models with the original Polity IV index does not alter our results substantially. 
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peaceful conditions since these factors affect our independent variables (Beck, Katz & Tucker, 
1998).  
In addition, we include oil export dependency, which is related to repression due to the so 
called ‘resource curse’ (de Soysa & Binningsbø, 2009). Following Michael Ross, we construct 
an oil production dummy taking the value 1 if oil and gas production exceed $100 per capita, and 
0 if not (Ross, 2012). It is noteworthy that we lag all controls by one year to avoid simultaneity 
bias. Finally, we also include a lagged dependent variable (LDV) in our models. There are two 
reasons for its inclusion. First, a lagged dependent variable also captures regional diffusion and 
spill-over effects that are not directly observed (Neumayer, 2005). Second, it is theoretically 
plausible that bureaucratic decisions associated with the organs of state repression use past 
decisions to repress or not in present circumstances, so that this behavior can be quite sticky 
(Poe, Tate, & Keith, 1999). The descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix 3. For more 
details on data definitions and sources, see Appendix 4. 
The baseline models are estimated using the Generalized Least Squares Fixed effects 
(FGLS) estimator. The pooled data are susceptible to having highly correlated data between and 
across panels that could lead to optimistic standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995). Using FGLS 
over a simple OLS allows estimations in the presence of AR (1) autocorrelation within panels 
and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity across the panels. As mentioned, we control for country 
and year-specific fixed effects. We also use Ordered Logit models since the outcome variable is 
rank ordered (1-5). In ordered logit estimations, we include only year-specific dummies because 
of including two-way fixed effects in non-linear estimations may be problematic due to the well-
known ‘incidental parameter problem’ (Lancaster, 2000, Wooldridge, 2002). 
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3.2 Endogeneity concerns 
It is quite possible that our key explanatory variables – US FDI and its disaggregated measures – 
are endogenous to having fewer human rights violations. That is, it might be that governments 
committed to respecting human rights attract more FDI as suggested by Blanton and Blanton 
(2006, 2009). For example, the expectation of instability arising out of dissent and uprising could 
deter foreign investors. Not taking this endogeneity into account would induce bias in our 
estimate of the effect of FDI on human rights. We thus control for endogeneity concerns by 
replicating the baseline estimations by using the system-GMM estimator as suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which is 
considered most appropriate in the presence of endogenous regressors. The dynamic panel GMM 
estimator exploits an assumption about the initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that 
remain informative even for persistent data. Second, and the most important reason why we use 
the GMM estimator, is because of the Nickell bias problem, as FGLS estimations tends to be 
inconsistent to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable and the presence of two-way fixed 
effects simultaneously in a short panel like ours (Nickell, 1981). 
The GMM results are based on a two-step estimator implemented by Roodman (2006). 
We apply the Sargan-Hansen test on the validity of the instruments used (amounting to a test for 
the exogeneity of the covariates) and the Arellano-Bond test of second order autocorrelation, 
which must be absent from the data in order for the estimator to be consistent. We treat both 
lagged dependent variable and our hypotheses variables (namely, total US FDI, extractive and 
non-extractive FDI) as endogenous, and the other variables as strictly exogenous. As before, we 
include time dummies in the GMM regressions. In order to minimize the number of instruments 
in the regressions, we collapse the matrix of instruments as suggested by Roodman (2006).  
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3.3 Interaction effects  
Next, we examine whether the negative effects of FDI on human rights are more prevalent in 
countries with weak institutions. This is an important consideration because extractive activities 
by firms are also prevalent in institutionally strong countries like Australia, Canada, Norway, 
among others where pressures for maintaining status-quo may not mean that human rights are 




Wherein,  is the interaction term between extractive FDI per capita (log) and the 
conditioning variable measuring the “quality of institutions” in a host country namely, the Polity 
regime type index ( ) in country i during year t-1. The interaction term is lagged by one-
year. We use Polity II index which is coded on a -10 to +10 scale, where the directionality of the 
index runs from strict autocracy to full democracy. The index is derived from coding of the 
following key components, which capture the strength of institutions in a polity; namely, 
competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the power of chief 
executive and competitiveness of political participation. These interaction effects will allow us to 
understand whether the negative effects of extractive FDI are concentrated in countries with 
weak institutions. Once again, we use the FGLS two-way fixed-effects estimator and generate 
marginal plots to assess the substantive effects of the conditional results.  
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4. Empirical Results 
Tables 1-4 present our regression results. Table 1 displays the results estimated using FGLS two-
way fixed effects models, which examine the relationship between human rights abuse and US 
FDI by sector, controlling for other determinants which are added in a stepwise manner. Table 2 
presents the replication of the baseline models using ordered logit estimators, and we report the 
marginal effects from ordered logit estimations in Figure 1. Table 3 presents the results 
addressing endogeneity concerns on the effects of US FDI and disaggregated measures on 
human rights violations using the SGMM method. Finally, Table 4 reports the results for 
extractive FDI in interaction with our institutional measure, and we present the conditional plot 
for this result in Figure 2.  
 
**********TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE********** 
 
As seen from column 1 in Table 1, the impact of total US FDI per capita on human rights 
violations is statistically insignificant. When other controls are added in the model, total US FDI 
has a statistically significant negative coefficient, independently of all the controls. Since higher 
values of the PTS index indicate more rights violations, the negative coefficient for total US FDI 
suggests that more FDI is related to better rights protection, similar to other studies on FDI and 
human rights (Meyer, 1996; Cingranelli & Richards, 1999; Apodaca, 2001; Apodaca, 2002; 
Hafner-Burton, 2005). As seen in column 2 in Table 1, at the mean value of US FDI per capita 
(log) (1.12) there is a 0.06-point decline in the PTS index, independent of other control variables. 
A standard deviation increase in FDI per capita (log) (1.56) above the mean value lowers the 
PTS index by roughly 0.17 points, which is significantly different from zero at the 1% level.  In 
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column 3, we replace total US FDI with two disaggregated measures namely, extractive and non-
extractive FDI per capita (log). We find that extractive FDI has a positive impact on PTS index, 
net of all the controls including non-extractive FDI, which is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The positive effect suggests that an increase in extractive investments increases the level of 
human rights violations. In the same model, we find contrary results related to non-extractive 
FDI, which is also significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The substantive effects 
suggest that a standard deviation increase in extractive FDI per capita (log) is associated with an 
increase in PTS index by 0.1 points. However, one standard deviation increase in non-extractive 
FDI per capita (log) is associated with a decrease in PTS index by 0.23 points, which is double 
the effect of extractive FDI. Thus, even when extractive FDI is accounted for, the level of non-
extractive FDI has a strong positive effect on human rights protection. These effects of non-
extractive FDI and extractive FDI, when included together in the same model, remain 
significantly different from zero at the 5% and 1% levels respectively as shown in column 4. The 
substantive effects of non-extractive FDI continue to be higher than that those of extractive FDI, 
net of all the control variables. Finally, our results on extractive vis-à-vis non-extractive FDI on 
human rights are robust to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in column 5 of Table 1. 
Thus, even when estimating the within-country variance with a lagged dependent variable, the 
hypothesis that extractive FDI reduces and non-extractive FDI increases human rights protection 
is upheld. Overall, these results support the argument for a negative “location-bound effect” 
(hypothesis 1) associated with extractive investment. These results support studies focused on 
mining projects that show that company-community conflicts increase where mining projects 
locate (Berger et al., 2017). 
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The results on the control variables are consistent with those reported by other studies. 
The level of income largely remains statistically insignificant. We find that countries with a 
larger population have more violations of rights. However, this effect is not consistent across all 
the models. We suspect that both income and population change slowly over time and hence are 
correlated with the fixed effects. This could be the reason why both variables are highly 
significant at the 1% level in ordered logit estimations in Table 2 where country fixed effects are 
not controlled. As expected, in all the models irrespective of estimation technique (in Table 1 
and 2), democracy is associated with fewer human rights violations. Likewise, civil peace years 
are associated with lower incidences of human rights abuse and civil conflicts with higher 
violations of human rights, as others also report (Poe & Tate, 1994, Poe et al., 1999). The 
variable for oil exporters in general is largely insignificant when estimating the models with the 
linear estimator in Table 1. Interestingly, our main results on extractive and non-extractive FDIs 
remain highly significant despite the inclusion of several statistically significant controls. 
Next, due to the rank-ordered nature the dependent variable PTS, we re-estimate the 
models using ordered logit controlling for year-specific dummies. These results are reported in 
Table 2.  
 
**********TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE********** 
 
As before, total US FDI per capita (log) is negative and significantly different from zero at the 
1% level in both column 1 and in column 2 where other controls are included. Likewise, we also 
find in column 3 and 4 that extractive FDI increases human rights violations while non-extractive 
FDI decreases violations. These results are largely similar to those reported in our baseline 
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estimations in Table 1. Our results of US FDI’s impact on human rights, thus, remain robust to 
utilizing alternative estimation techniques. 
 
**********FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE********** 
 
To understand the magnitude of our results in the ordered logit models, we compute the 
marginal effects at the mean of both extractive and non-extractive FDI per capita (log). It is 
noteworthy that marginal effects in ordered logit are not straightforward to interpret. We follow 
Dreher et al. (2010) and compute estimated probabilities before and after a shock of one standard 
deviation of extractive and non-extractive FDIs on the PTS (see Figure 1). Accordingly, non-
extractive FDI has a higher impact compared to extractive FDI. The estimated probability of 
observing the PTS index values of 1, 2 and 3 (at the mean of all variables) are 4%, 25% and 
19%, respectively, while index values 4 and 5 occur with a predicted probability of 3% and 
0.3%. However, after an increase in non-extractive FDI per capita (log) by one standard 
deviation these predictions get higher, i.e., 6% and 29% for low PTS index values 1 and 2 (fewer 
or no human rights violations). They decrease for the higher PTS index values 3, 4 and 5 to 
13.5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively. Similarly, after an increase in extractive FDI by one standard 
deviation the predictions get marginally lower for low PTS index values, i.e., 3% and 23% for 1 
and 2, while they increase for the high PTS index values 3, 4 and 5 to 20%, 3% and 0.4%, 
respectively. These effects are not only statistically significant, but also quantitatively important. 
Next, we examine our models controlling for possible endogeneity between human rights 
and types of FDI. As discussed earlier, we make use of the System-GMM method.  
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**********TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE********** 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the models estimated using GMM. The Hansen test and the 
Arellano-Bond test do not reject the SGMM specifications at conventional levels of significance 
across the columns, indicating that endogeneity may not be a major problem. The Hansen J-
Statistic clearly shows that the null-hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected at the 
conventional level of statistical significance. As can be seen from column 1, total US FDI per 
capita (log) is negative and significantly different zero at the 1% level. These results remain 
robust to the inclusion of various control variables in column 2. In column 3 and 4, we include 
both extractive and non-extractive measures of US FDI per capita (log). As seen, extractive FDI 
is positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level in column 3 and 4. Notice that 
even after controlling for potential feedback from the PTS index, the coefficient value of column 
5 in Table 1 (in which a lagged dependent variable is also included) is reduced only marginally. 
Likewise, we find that non-extractive FDI per capita (log) has a significant negative impact on 
the PTS index at the 1% confidence level. These results highlight an interesting point. First, they 
show that the size of the coefficient for both forms of FDI are, by and large, similar in GMM and 
non-GMM regression estimates, and they suggest that endogeneity may not be a major problem. 
 
4.1 Conditional Effects 
Thus far, we examined the direct effect of FDI on human rights violations. Next, in Table 4, we 
examine whether the effects of extractive FDI, in particular, are conditional on the level of 
institutional quality. We introduce an interaction term between extractive FDI and the Polity 
index, which is our measure of institutional quality in Table 4.  
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*********TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE********** 
 
In column 1, only the interaction term is included without any control variables. We do however 
control for non-extractive FDI. While in column 2, we include all other control variables, column 
3 also includes a lagged dependent variable. As seen in column 1-3, the interaction term is 
negative but statistically insignificant. Interestingly though, our extractive FDI per capita (log) 
measure on its own, i.e., when the institutions measure is 0, has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on human rights violations. Likewise, the effect of institutions (Polity index) on 
human rights violations is negative when extractive FDI per capita is 0, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. It is important to note that the interpretation of the interaction term 
even in linear models is not straightforward. Consequently, a simple t-test on the coefficient of 
the interaction term is not sufficient to examine whether the interaction term is statistically 
significant, or otherwise (Ai & Norton, 2003).  
We rely on marginal plots for assessing the nature of the conditional effects. The 
interactive effect is best assessed with a margins plot which depicts the magnitude of the 
interaction in Figure 2. To calculate the marginal effect of extractive US FDI per capita (log) on 
the PTS index, we take into account both the conditioning variable (Polity index) and the 
interaction term, and we display graphically the total marginal effect conditional on the Polity 
index. The y-axis of Figure 2 displays the marginal effect of US extractive FDI per capita (log), 
and the marginal effect is evaluated on the Polity index variable on the x-axis. Note that we 
include the 95% confidence interval in Figure 2.  
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**********FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE********** 
 
In line with our theoretical expectations, extractive FDI per capita (log) increases the PTS index 
(at the 95% confidence level at least) when the Polity index is lower than the score of 6. In other 
words, the marginal effects are significant and positive when the upper bound of the confidence 
interval is above zero. The marginal effects suggest that extractive FDI increases the PTS index 
by 0.1 points when the Polity index score is 6. Consider a country which has a Polity index score 
of -10 (a strict autocracy). A point increase in US extractive FDI per capita (log) in a country 
with a Polity score of -10 would increase the PTS index by almost 0.15 points, i.e. FDI is 
connected with more human rights abuse at high levels of autocracy. Interestingly, the margins 
plot also shows that the effect of extractive FDI on human rights violations becomes statistically 
insignificant once the Polity IV index of a host country is above 6, i.e., in a country with stronger 
democratic institutions. These results suggest that the negative effects of extractive FDI on 
human rights are more prevalent in host countries with weak institutions, supporting our 
hypothesis 2, which proposed a “democratic safeguard effect”. This might also be one of the 
main reasons why FDI in extractive industries in countries, such as Australia, Canada, Norway, 
and Chile, is not associated with the repression of human rights. 
 
4.2 Checks on Robustness 
We examine the robustness of our main findings in the following ways. First, we exclude high-
income OECD countries, which seldom have bad human rights records. It is quite plausible that 
the results might be driven by these countries. The new results (without high-income OECD 
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countries, reported in Table A in our supplementary file)7 remain robust and mirror those 
reported in our baseline estimations.  
Second, we use the PTS in its disaggregated version, which is based on only Amnesty 
International reports, to avoid any form of biases which are likely to be present in the PTS index 
based on sources by the US State Department (Qian & Yanagizawa, 2009). Our new results with 
the Amnesty International PTS index (reported in Table B, supplementary file) still show strong 
significant effects for extractive FDI and the abuse of human rights. These results remain robust 
to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable and alternative estimations techniques, such as 
ordered logit.  
Third, following de Soysa and Vadlamannati (2012, 2011) we run all our results using an 
alternative measure for human rights, the physical integrity rights index (PIR hereafter), sourced 
from the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Database (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). This 
measure is available annually from 1981 onwards until 2011 for 195 countries.8 The source of 
information used for coding the index are the same as for the PTS, but the PIR data are collated 
somewhat differently.9 The PIR is an additive index constructed from measures of torture, 
extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearances. It ranges from 0, meaning no 
government respect for these four human rights to 8, or full government respect for these four 
human rights. Once again, our results (in Table C of our supplementary file) based on PIR index 
as dependent variable remain robust.  
Fourth, we estimate our baseline models by excluding outliers in all our FDI variables, as 
extreme values could influence our main findings. Excluding the outliers aggregated and 
 
7 The supplementary file will be available in our replication materials upon request. 
8 One main reason why we do not use this measure in our main analysis is the data is available only until 2011. 
9 For more on construction of the dataset and coding rules, see CIRI Human Rights Data project, retrieved February 
27, 2019, from: http://www.humanrightsdata.com. 
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disaggregated for US FDI per capita from the sample does not change our main results 
substantially (Table D). Fifth, we use an alternative method of operationalization of our main 
variable of interest. Instead of per capita FDI, we use FDI measures as a share of GDP, which is 
an alternative proxy of penetration of FDI into the host economy, and FDI measured in US$ 
million (log). Our baseline specifications estimated using these alternative FDI measures remain 
robust and, in the direction, reported above (Table E).   
Sixth, Clarke and Kwon (2018) propose that any negative effects of FDI on human rights 
might be diminishing over time, mostly because there is now less primary sector FDI within 
overall FDI, which may have driven the negative effects of FDI. We extend this argument by 
proposing that even for problematic extractive FDI, improvements over time are plausible 
because new guidelines and voluntary codes for the extractive industries aim at changing foreign 
investors’ impact on the ground.10 We test this proposition by interacting both measures of FDI, 
extractive and non-extractive FDI per capita (log), with year-specific dummies. We report these 
results in Table F in the supplementary file, and in Figure A here. We find that the negative 
human rights effects of extractive FDI tend to increase over time, rather than diminish. The 
positive effects of non-extractive FDI on human rights protection tend to increase over time. We 
present a graphical representation of coefficients of both variables from interactions with year 
dummies in Figure A. As seen there, the effects of extractive and non-extractive FDI on human 
rights continue to diverge significantly over time. This supports existing criticism that suggests 
that initiatives in soft and hard law against negative impacts in the extractive sectors do not go 
far enough in creating tangible changes on the ground (Schrempf-Stirling & Wettstein, 2017). 
Since such initiatives have become stronger in recent years, it might be that improvements may 
take decades, and that they do not yet show in the data. 
 
10 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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Taken together with our findings on the impact of weak institutions, future research 
should investigate the lack of improvement over time in more detail, and in particular, assess 
what is driving the worsening of extractive FDI effects versus increasingly good impact of non-
extractive FDI. The fact that global consumers, such as in the garment and fashion industry, do 
not have ways of knowing and punishing bad behavior in the extractive sector is possibly a 
strong explanation. 
Finally, we re-estimate all the models by dropping the variables for which we could not 
find any statistical significance. These include per capita income, autocracy, oil exports share 
dummy, and peace years. With these modifications, our results on extractive and non-extractive 
FDI on human rights are upheld and remain robust. These robustness results are not shown here 
but are reported in the supplementary file. Overall, these findings suggest that our results are 
robust not only to the size of the sample and alternative methods of operationalization of our 




Most studies on the question of FDI and human rights report positive effects, supporting the 
liberal contention that multinational companies bring benefits to host countries, including 
improvements in governance. Case-study based research, as well as studies of civil war and 
armed violence, often implicate multinational corporations in human rights violations and armed 
violence within host countries. Our study provides evidence that the impact of US FDI on human 
rights varies across industries. In particular, we propose that extractive firms in the oil and 
mining industries are bound to the location of resources, which creates a status quo bias among 
them when it comes to explicit, or tacit, support when dealing with repressive rulers (“location-
bound effect”). We find a negative effect of extractive US FDI on human rights protection. The 
same is not true for non-extractive MNCs in manufacturing or services, which is connected to 
greater protection of human rights. We also find that strong democratic institutions can condition 
the negative impacts of extractive FDI on human rights (“democratic safeguard effect”), so that 
the effect of FDI is zero on human rights where the constraints on the executive are strong.  
With these findings, we addressed an important gap in existing statistical studies on FDI 
and human rights. Most studies have simply used total FDI instead of disaggregating FDI. We 
think that sharper theory needs to focus on the heterogenous nature of FDI and its impacts on 
political and economic life. Recent statistical (large-N) studies on FDI suggest increasing 
conflict when FDI locates in mining activity, particularly in Africa (Berger et al., 2017). It stands 
to reason then that extractive FDI should be associated with human rights violations given that 
governments have a strong interest in stamping out dangerous dissent, whether companies desire 
such crackdowns or not. Many existing studies have stressed that “human rights behavior of 
multinationals may vary depending on sectoral differences” (Kim & Trumbore, 2010, p. 732), 
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proposing that “the sector invested in, determines whether foreign investment is beneficial for 
host countries” (Apodaca, 2002, p. 902), and that future research should examine “particular 
forms of FDI” (Sorens & Ruger, 2012, p. 6). Building on a new development in the quantitative 
literature towards more differentiation (Blanton & Blanton, 2009; Janz, 2018), we employ 
disaggregated industry-specific data to assess impacts on human rights. Our study also shows 
that it is important to integrate host-country conditions. Crucially, the findings suggest that 
qualitative case studies, alongside NGO and media reports, do not merely amount to anecdotal 
evidence, but they reflect larger patterns of negative impacts from extractive industries across 
countries and time. Future studies might probe more carefully how exactly FDI in the extractive 
sector balances out its obligations to multilateral initiatives relative to the economic losses from 
societal dissent.  
The implications for policy and voluntary standards are clear: we need to see the 
development of stronger democratic safeguards; otherwise efforts of individual firms may not 
produce tangible improvements – even if some firms want to do better. Such initiatives as the 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) have come a long way towards facilitating 
transparency and providing a platform for company-community conflict resolution (Lujala, 
Rustad, Le Billon, 2017). Finally, we find it worrying that the negative effects of non-extractive 
FDI on human rights protection tend to increase over time, rather than improve, as we showed in 
our robustness tests. This finding is preliminary, and not much time has passed since the Ruggie 
framework and voluntary guidelines in the extractive industry are adopted; but the finding 
supports criticism of soft and hard law, which suggests that these initiatives do not go far enough 
(Schrempf-Stirling & Wettstein, 2017) – in particular in areas with weak democratic institutions. 
Global hard law initiatives might also do well to question the current norms that legalize the 
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“might is right” principle when it comes to natural resources, which would give firms a massive 
incentive to act in ways that will constrain their support for repressive regimes (Wenar, 2016). 
One might also research the many ways in which local communities close to extractive activity 
might act as a constraint on national-level politics, and how bargaining failures between MNCs 
and local communities might be prevented for getting better win-win solutions.  
By integrating the industry-sector level with domestic country context, we open up new 
avenues for statistical as well as qualitative case study work. Future quantitative research should 
explore further boundary conditions under which improvements of FDI on human rights can be 
expected, while qualitative evidence on the firm-level is equally necessary to trace under which 
circumstances policy changes can be more effective in protecting the rights of local 
communities. Why, for example, do some firms internalize a greater sense of social 
responsibility than others? How much leverage can companies have over governments intent on 
political survival, especially given the fierce competition for natural resources into the future? 
We encourage mixed-methods research designs for overcoming the existing disconnect between 
statistical analyses at the macro level and single case studies focused on the micro level. 
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Table 1: Aggregated and disaggregated measures of FDI and Human Rights 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PTS PTS PTS PTS PTS
US FDI percapita (log) t-1 -0.0373 -0.0616**
(0.0283) (0.0281)
US Non-extractive FDI percapita (log) t-1 -0.0907*** -0.118*** -0.0864***
(0.0348) (0.0347) (0.0329)
US Extractive FDI percapita (log) t-1 0.0897** 0.101** 0.0789**
(0.0415) (0.0419) (0.0401)
Per capita GDP (log) t-1 0.0491 0.114 0.142*
(0.0856) (0.0888) (0.0846)
Population (log) t-1 0.351*** 0.193 0.201
(0.134) (0.144) (0.143)
Democracy dummy t-1 -0.280*** -0.323*** -0.216***
(0.0555) (0.0591) (0.0568)
Autocracy dummy t-1 0.0499 0.167 0.189
(0.118) (0.126) (0.116)
Oil exports dummy t-1 0.0108 0.0216 0.0314
(0.0564) (0.0590) (0.0550)
Civil war dummy t-1 0.405*** 0.408*** 0.177***
(0.0434) (0.0454) (0.0445)
Peace Years t-1 -0.00247 -0.00165 -0.000658
(0.00221) (0.00245) (0.00240)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.422***
(0.0226)
Constant 4.645*** -2.298 4.663*** 0.0147 -1.961
(0.114) (2.567) (0.115) (2.751) (2.721)
Extimations GLS-FE GLS-FE GLS-FE GLS-FE GLS-FE
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,080 1,980 1,888 1,802 1,652
Number of Countries 157 150 156 150 149  





Table 2: Aggregated and disaggregated measures of FDI and Human Rights – Ordered Logit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PTS PTS PTS PTS
US FDI percapita (log) t-1 -0.635*** -0.226***
(0.0309) (0.0503)
US Non-extractive FDI percapita (log) t-1 -0.744*** -0.351***
(0.0409) (0.0596)
US Extractive FDI percapita (log) t-1 0.119** 0.127*
(0.0510) (0.0758)
Per capita GDP (log) t-1 -0.500*** -0.453***
(0.0584) (0.0627)
Population (log) t-1 0.521*** 0.557***
(0.0332) (0.0348)
Democracy dummy t-1 -1.095*** -1.145***
(0.115) (0.121)
Autocracy dummy t-1 -0.0271 -0.0792
(0.137) (0.140)
Oil exports dummy t-1 0.699*** 0.505***
(0.109) (0.114)
Civil war dummy t-1 2.088*** 2.134***
(0.169) (0.177)
Peace Years t-1 -0.0100*** -0.00684**
(0.00263) (0.00267)
Extimations Ologit Ologit Ologit Ologit
Country Fixed Effects No No No No
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,080 1,980 1,888 1,802
Number of Countries 157 150 156 150  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Aggregated and disaggregated measures of FDI and Human Rights – GMM 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PTS PTS PTS PTS
US FDI percapita (log) t-1 -0.0775*** -0.0397*
(0.0175) (0.0228)
US Non-extractive FDI percapita (log) t-1 -0.0809*** -0.0635***
(0.0136) (0.0148)
US Extractive FDI percapita (log) t-1 0.0595*** 0.0833***
(0.0183) (0.0188)
Per capita GDP (log) t-1 -0.0777*** -0.0537***
(0.0221) (0.0182)
Population (log) t-1 0.0991*** 0.0977***
(0.0178) (0.0126)
Democracy dummy t-1 -0.199*** -0.150***
(0.0421) (0.0311)
Autocracy dummy t-1 0.0198 0.0592*
(0.0358) (0.0341)
Oil exports dummy t-1 0.111*** 0.0325
(0.0311) (0.0240)
Civil war dummy t-1 0.283*** 0.174***
(0.0762) (0.0496)
Peace Years t-1 -0.00110 -0.00146**
(0.000949) (0.000702)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.684*** 0.525*** 0.767*** 0.626***
(0.0589) (0.0779) (0.0249) (0.0456)
Extimations SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM
Country Fixed Effects No No No No
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) p-value 0.016 0.088 0.128 0.137
Hansen J-statistic [p-value ] 0.223 0.143 0.141 0.182
Number of Instruments 57 64 78 85
Number of Observations 1,888 1,801 1,727 1,652
Number of Countries 156 149 155 149  




Table 4: Extractive FDI, Institutions and Human Rights – Interaction effects 
(1) (2) (3)
PTS PTS PTS
US Extractive FDI percapita (log) t-1 X Polity index t-1 -0.00460 -0.00616 -0.00471
(0.00544) (0.00527) (0.00507)
Polity index t-1 -0.0387*** -0.0378*** -0.0264***
(0.00597) (0.00586) (0.00566)
US Extractive FDI percapita (log) t-1 0.151*** 0.119*** 0.0914**
(0.0454) (0.0443) (0.0418)
US Non-extractive FDI percapita (log) t-1 -0.119*** -0.104*** -0.0773**
(0.0353) (0.0345) (0.0327)
Per capita GDP (log) t-1 0.0584 0.0989
(0.0883) (0.0846)
Population (log) t-1 0.216 0.209
(0.144) (0.144)
Oil exports dummy t-1 0.0329 0.0376
(0.0588) (0.0549)
Civil war dummy t-1 0.406*** 0.177***
(0.0452) (0.0444)
Peace Years t-1 -0.00180 -0.000915
(0.00244) (0.00239)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.414***
(0.0227)
Constant 4.636*** -0.0501 -1.816
(0.218) (2.748) (2.723)
Extimations GLS-FE GLS-FE GLS-FE
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,818 1,802 1,652
Number of Countries 153 150 149  










Cases registered against US firms for alleged Human rights violations under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
 
Year US Company facing 
allegations 
Complain party Allegations 
1993 Texaco (Chevron) Cristóbal Bonifaz 
and fellow lawyers 
Allegations of polluting rain forests and rivers in their countries, 






group of Nigerians 
Allegations of human rights violations, including torture and 
execution by Nigerian paramilitary in concert with Chevron to 
suppress the protests against environmental practices in Niger Delta.  
2001 Del Monte Inc. trade union leaders Allegations of torture and unlawful detention related to the union’s 
efforts to organize.   
2001 Drummond coal 
company 
victims  Allegations of murdering three union leaders at one of its mines in 
Colombia 
2001 Wal-Mart Six female 
employees  
Allegations of discrimination in salary, bonuses and training.  
2001 Coca-Cola Colombian trade 
union 
Allegations of assisting the paramilitary in murdering several union 
members  
2001 Exxon Mobil 
Corporation 
victims Allegations of hiring military to protect the oil basins leading to 







Allegations of crimes against humanity and wrongful death on behalf 
of Ecuadorian subsistence farmers with no connection to the drug 
trade whose crops are being subjected to sustained, deadly aerial 
assaults financed by the US government through DynCorp. 
2003 Occidental Petroleum 
and Airscan, Inc. 
Center for Human 
Rights in US 
Allegations of murder of innocent civilians in the hamlet of Santo 




Talisman Energy Inc. 
Presbyterian 
Church of Sudan 
An allegation of being complicit in the Sudanese military’s genocidal 
assault, forced displacement and enslavement of non-Muslim African 
Sudanese from 1997 to 2003. 
2004 DaimlerChrysler victims' relatives Allegations of disappearances and tortures of workers and union 
leaders during Argentina's civil war 
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2004 Unocal 15 villagers from 
Myanmar 
Allegations of human right abuses during the building of a gas 
pipeline in Myanmar 








Dow Chemical Victims’ of Bhopal 
Gas tragedy, India 
Allegations of flouting environmental standards leading to one of the 
world’s biggest industrial disasters. 
2005 Firestone 
(Bridgestone Corp.) 
victims Allegations of poor working conditions at the rubber plantation and 
amount to forced labour in Liberia. 
2005 US retailers in Saipan NGOs and 
garment workers 
Allegations of violating Fair Labour Standards Act and misleading 
advertising, by labeling goods as ‘sweatshop free.’ 
2006 Occidental Petroleum victims Allegations of using military and paramilitary death squads to guard 
pipeline in Ecuador, resulting in against the local population. 
2009 Shell's oil victims Allegations of various forms of human rights violations including 
murder charges of nine democratic activists.  
Notes: The list is obviously not exhaustive due to limited availability of information. Sourced from: Alien Tort 



















Appendix 2: List of countries under study 
Afghanistan China Guyana Mauritius Singapore
Albania Colombia Haiti Mexico Slovak Republic
Algeria Comoros Honduras Moldova Slovenia
Angola Congo, Dem. Rep. Hungary Mongolia Solomon Islands
Antigua and Barbuda Congo, Rep. India Morocco South Africa
Argentina Costa Rica Indonesia Mozambique Spain
Armenia Cote d'Ivoire Iran, Islamic Rep. Myanmar Sri Lanka
Australia Croatia Iraq Namibia Sudan
Austria Cuba Ireland Nepal Suriname
Azerbaijan Cyprus Israel Netherlands Swaziland
Bahamas, The Czech Republic Italy New Zealand Sweden
Bahrain Denmark Jamaica Nicaragua Switzerland
Bangladesh Djibouti Japan Niger Syrian Arab Republic
Barbados Dominican Republic Jordan Nigeria Tajikistan
Belarus Ecuador Kazakhstan Norway Tanzania
Belgium Egypt, Arab Rep. Kenya Oman Thailand
Belize El Salvador Korea, Dem. People's Rep. Pakistan Timor-Leste
Benin Equatorial Guinea Korea, Rep. Panama Togo
Bhutan Eritrea Kuwait Papua New Guinea Trinidad and Tobago
Bolivia Estonia Kyrgyz Republic Paraguay Tunisia
Bosnia and Herzegovina Ethiopia Lao PDR Peru Turkey
Botswana Fiji Latvia Philippines Turkmenistan
Brazil Finland Lebanon Poland Uganda
Brunei Darussalam France Lesotho Portugal Ukraine
Bulgaria Gabon Liberia Qatar United Arab Emirates
Burkina Faso Gambia, The Libya Romania United Kingdom
Burundi Georgia Lithuania Russian Federation United States
Cabo Verde Germany Macedonia, FYR Rwanda Uruguay
Cambodia Ghana Madagascar Sao Tome and Principe Uzbekistan
Cameroon Greece Malawi Saudi Arabia Venezuela, RB
Canada Grenada Malaysia Senegal Vietnam
Central African Republic Guatemala Maldives Serbia Yemen, Rep.
Chad Guinea Mali Seychelles Zambia













Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations
PTS index 2.686 1.084 1.000 5.000 3498
US FDI percapita 12.094 55.733 -4.335 890.653 3674
US FDI percapita (log) 1.119 1.565 -2.173 7.485 3674
US Non-extractive FDI percapita 10.956 53.566 -4.361 889.222 3492
US Non-extractive FDI percapita (log) 1.008 1.524 -2.179 7.483 3492
US Extractive FDI percapita 0.658 3.059 -2.460 46.218 3642
US Extractive FDI percapita (log) 0.249 0.674 -1.632 4.527 3642
Per capita GDP (log) 8.237 1.530 4.752 11.425 4240
Population (log) 15.889 1.741 11.108 21.039 4413
Democracy dummy 0.441 0.497 0.000 1.000 4066
Autocracy dummy 0.151 0.358 0.000 1.000 4066
Oil exports dummy 0.259 0.438 0.000 1.000 4405
Civil war dummy 0.173 0.378 0.000 1.000 4130
Peace years 23.094 21.309 0.000 69.000 4130  
 
Appendix 4: Data sources and definitions 
Variables Data definition and sources 
PTS index 
 
Coded on 1-5 scale wherein 1 means proper rule of law, no illegal detentions, 
and torture is exceptional and extra judiciary murders are extremely rare 
sourced from Gibney et al. (2012) 
US FDI measures 
Extractive, Non-extractive and total US FDI per capita (log) sourced from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) statistics 2019, Washington D.C. 
Per capita GDP (log) 
GDP per head in 2000 US$ constant prices sourced from the World 
Development Indicators 2018, World Bank. 
Democracy  
Based on Polity IV index (-10 to +10) takes the value 1 if the Polity IV index is 
+6 and above and 0 otherwise. 
Autocracy 
Based on Polity IV index (-10 to +10) takes the value 1 if the Polity IV index is 
-5 and below and 0 otherwise. 
Population (log) 
Total population count (logged) sourced from the World Development 
Indicators 2018, World Bank. 
Oil Exports dummy 
Coded the value 1 if a country i in year t natural resources exports are more 
than 1/3rd of the country’s total exports sourced from World Bank dataset. 
Civil conflict  
Dummy coded 1 for each year a country has at least one active conflict 
obtained from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016 
Peace Years 
Count of number of peace years sourced from the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program, 2016 
 
  
